Abstract: When modern hardware and software technologies are integrated into smart grid, numerous vulnerabilities are introduced at the same time. The vulnerabilities are now leveraged by malicious users for the purpose of electricity theft. Many approaches are proposed to identify malicious users. However, some of them have low detection rates; the others suer from either low inspection speed or huge cost of deploying monitoring devices. In this paper, to accurately locate malicious users stealing electricity in a fast and economic way, we propose three novel inspection algorithms. First, Binary-Coded Grouping-based Inspection (BCGI) algorithm is proposed. Under some assumptions, it can locate malicious users with only one inspection step. Given n users, the BCGI algorithm requires (log2(n)) inspectors. Unfortunately, in some cases we do not have enough inspectors for the BCGI algorithm to work. To deal with these cases, we further propose two algorithms: M-ary Coded Grouping-based Inspection (MCGI) and Generalized BCGI (G-BCGI). In the MCGI algorithm, users' identification (ID) numbers are encoded into (l + 1)-nary notations, where l is adaptively determined by the number of users and the number of available inspectors. It can locate malicious users within l inspection steps. In G-BCGI algorithm, users' IDs are encoded into binary notations, similar to the BCGI algorithm, and multiple rounds may be needed to locate malicious users. Experiment results show that the proposed algorithms can locate malicious users accurately and eciently.
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Introduction
Compared to a traditional power system, a smart grid provides more reliable, economical, and environment-friendly energy management. Many countries are striving to establish their own smart grids [1] . Nevertheless, each coin has two sides. Smart grid itself also has drawbacks [2] . Many vulnerabilities are introduced when modern hardware and software technologies (e.g., advanced metering infrastructure and information and communication technologies) are integrated into smart grids [3] . Among these vulnerabilities, the risk of security breaches garners the most attentions [4] . Electricity theft is one special form of security breaches and has harassed the worldwide utility companies for a long time.
On the whole, electricity theft grows even more serious in smart grids. Apart from physical attacks such as directly hooking from line and bypassing energy meters, malicious users can also launch various invisible cyber attacks to tamper with smart meters anytime and anywhere. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) warns that insiders and individuals with only a moderate level of computer * Corresponding author knowledge are likely able to compromise meters with lowcost tools and software readily available on the Internet [5] .
Many negative and severe effects come with electricity theft. First, huge economic losses are brought to the utility companies, which are further spared to all the users. For example, the annual losses caused by electricity theft in UK amount to ¿500 million, putting extra ¿30 a year on individuals' bills [6] . Besides, it overloads the generation unit and drastically impinges on the power quality, resulting in users' electronics and appliances harmed and even damaged more easily. To top it all off, some malicious users (especially the ones adopting physical attacks) even lose their lives when trying to steal electricity.
Numerous approaches are proposed to detect electricity theft. In papers [7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13] , various machine learning approaches, such as support vector machine and extreme learning machine, are applied to analyze users' load-profile information. The malicious users 1 are recognized as the ones who exhibit abnormal behaviors that are 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 highly correlated with electricity theft. These approaches have a relatively low detection rate but a rather high false positive rate. In papers [14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28] , redundant monitoring devices (e.g., sensors and inspectors) are installed at the utility company side for detecting the malicious users. These approaches are able to identify the malicious users with absolute certainty. Nonetheless, the inspection speed or the cost issue becomes the major concern.
To address the above limitations, this paper first proposes a novel Binary-Coded Grouping-based Inspection (BCGI) algorithm. Under some assumptions, the BCGI algorithm is able to locate a malicious user by only one inspection step. It consists of two phases -a grouping phase and an inspecting phase. During the grouping phase, the users are grouped according to the binary notations of their identification numbers; and during the inspecting phase, the malicious users are identified in line with the inspectors' states. Given n users, the BCGI algorithm needs Θ(log 2 (n)) 2 inspectors. However, in some cases (e.g., when there are a lot of users in the smart grid, but very limited budget for installing inspectors), we do not have enough inspectors for the BCGI algorithm to work. To conquer the limitation of the BCGI algorithm, we propose two more algorithms: M-ary Coded Grouping-based Inspection (MCGI) and Generalized BCGI (G-BCGI). In the MCGI algorithm, users' IDs are encoded into (l + 1)-nary notations, where l is adaptively determined by the total number of users and the number of available inspectors. For different inspection steps, users are regrouped based upon different digits (i.e., 0, 1, ..., l − 1, l) of the (l + 1)-nary notations of users' ID numbers. The MCGI algorithm can locate a malicious user within l inspection steps. In the G-BCGI algorithm, users are allocated with unique ID numbers for different inspection steps. These ID numbers are then encoded into binary notations, according to which users are grouped. In essential, both the MCGI and G-BCGI algorithms are general forms of the BCGI algorithm. They can be used when we are short of inspectors for the BCGI algorithm to work. Theoretical analyses and experiment results show that the G-BCGI algorithm can locate malicious users more quickly than the MCGI algorithm. The contributions of this paper are highlighted as follows:
First, we propose the BCGI algorithm, which can locate malicious users with only one inspection step under the assumption that there are Θ(log 2 (n)) available inspectors, given n users;
Next, to deal with the cases where we are short of inspectors for the BCGI algorithm to work, we propose the MCGI algorithm, which can locate malicious users within l inspection steps.
Furthermore, we propose the G-BCGI algorithm, which is proved to be able to locate malicious users more quickly than the MCGI algorithm.
In addition, theoretic analyses are provided on the performance of the BCGI, MCGI and G-BCGI algorithms;
Finally, experiment results show that the proposed algorithms are efficient to locate the malicious users.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related work. Section 3 defines the problem. We propose the BCGI algorithm in Section 4, and both the MCGI and G-BCGI algorithms in Section 5, with theoretical analyses and examples provided. In Section 6, experiment results are reported. The conclusion and the future work are presented in Section 7.
Related Work
Smart Grid is one special kind of cyber-physical systems in which security becomes more complex since they normally involve both cyber and physical aspects [29, 30] . In recent years, there are many published papers for detecting malicious meters. Among these works, the most popular ones are the various kinds of machine learning-based approaches [7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13] , which usually involve training a classifier with a historical dataset and then applying it to find irregularities or deviations in the customer energy consumption profile. For instance, in paper [31] the simplified encoded data are classified into three classes to detect the malicious users, by applying both support vector machine and rule engine based algorithms. Similarly, the paper [10] proposes an extreme learning machine-based approach to expose abnormal behaviors that are highly correlated with the electricity theft activities. One problem with the utilization of these machine learning-based classifiers for identifying malicious meters is the data imbalance, i.e., the numbers of normal and abnormal samples differs greatly [13] . The benign samples are easily available using historical data, while the thorough dataset of attack samples are desperately wanted. This limits their detection rate which is now approximately 60% ∼ 70% [32] . In addition, if the non-malicious factors, such as the change of residents, appliances, and seasonality, are not dealt with appropriately, these approaches exhibit a relatively high false positive rate. This raises a controversy between users and utility companies. Another drawback is that these schemes involve the parameter optimization problems and have a high computational burden in training phases [33] . Some of the following methods can be potentially adopted to enhance performance along this line of work. In [34] , a modified, effective, and incremental support vector ordinal regression algorithm is proposed to enhance training process. In [35] , a multilevel pattern mining architecture is proposed to leverage association rule deduction, frequent sequential pattern mining, frequent 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 temporal pattern mining, etc. In [36] , a back propagation (BP) neural network model is adopted to reduce all kinds of errors due to non-linear fitting of BP. In [37] , a robust regularization path algorithm based on v-support vector classification with a regularization parameter v is proposed to enhance classification performance and to reduce classification errors. In [38] , a structural minimax probability machine based on generative prior knowledge is proposed to reduce misclassification. However, these approaches still have the limitations indicated as the above.
Another kind of approaches is called real-time comparison explained as follows. The basic idea is to install specific monitoring devices at the utility company end. For example, the paper [39] introduces a system for detecting electricity theft, by installing feeder meters on electrical lines. In this system, each feeder meter is connected to a plurality of distribution transformers (DTM), and then each DTM is in turn coupled to several users. Through this method, we can know whether there exist users misbehaving in certain group. However, we cannot locate malicious users exactly. The paper [14] leverages a central observer meter to register the overall energy consumption of the users in the neighborhood area network. The malicious users are located by solving a linear system of equations for obtaining the "honesty coefficients". However, the assumptions such as the linear independence of equations and the zero resistance of energy cables do not often hold [40] . To overcome this shortcoming, the papers [22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27] apply the Lagrange polynomial interpolation [41] to extend the mathematical model such that it can handle the nonlinear attack models. By equipping each user with one extra smart meter at the utility company end, the paper [17] proposes a mutual inspection strategy to ensure the non-repudiation of electricity theft. Nevertheless, the cost of this scheme is very huge, especially in the metropolitan area (e.g., New York, Beijing, Tokyo, and etc.). For the purpose of cost saving, the papers [15, 19, 18] successively propose a series of inspection algorithms based on the logical binary trees, which exploit only two inspectors -one head inspector and one sub-inspector. The paper [21] proposes the intersected grouping technique. However, the authors do not give a clear demonstration on how to perform the intersected grouping process and consequently the inspection speed cannot be guaranteed.
In contrast, the proposed BCGI algorithm groups the users according to the binary representation of their identification numbers; and under some assumptions, the malicious users can be located by only one inspection step. Particularly, for the cases where we do not have enough inspectors for the BCGI algorithm to work, we propose the MCGI and G-BCGI algorithms. Note that our methods are significantly different from other works.
A short-version preliminary work of the BCGI algorithm was presented in the conference in [20] . We briefly summarize some of the new contributions of this paper over our preliminary conference version [20] as follows. This paper significantly extends the BCGI algorithm in the conference version [20] , fixes some minor errors, and provides much more comprehensive theoretic analyses on the BCGI algorithm with detailed proofs.
The proposed MCGI and G-BCGI algorithms in this paper along with theoretic analyses, experiments, and comparisons are totally new in this paper and are not shown in [20] .
Problem Statement
Problem
In Fig. 1 , we display a simplified illustration of a neighborhood area smart grid. As we can see, there is a smart meter recording electricity consumptions at each user's premise. The service provider transmits the power to the neighborhood area via the electrical flow. This electrical flow goes through the substation, the distribution room, the feeders at the users' side, and finally the users' houses. On the other hand, through the widely deployed communication network (e.g., the Internet or the public switched telephone network), the smart meters can exchange information with the service provider as well as the inspectors which are installed in the distribution room. Each inspector is in charge of a group of smart meters. Note that both the electrical flow and the communication flow are bidirectional.
Assume that there are a total number of n users periodically sending their meters' readings to the utility company in this neighborhood area smart grid. Among all the users, there are at most m (m ≤ n) users who would compromise their smart meters at random times, via either physical or cyber attacks. To achieve the goal of stealing electricity, malicious users manipulate electricity consumption reported values to smaller values. We assume that at the beginning, there are no malicious users in this neighborhood area smart grid. This paper investigates the malicious meter inspection (MMI) problem [15] whose objective is to minimize the number of inspection steps needed to identify the malicious users who appear in the neighborhood area, by using the limited number of inspectors installed in the distribution room. For each inspection step, the inspectors measure the total value of electricity distributed to their own group of users. These users in turn report their electricity consumptions to the corresponding inspectors. After the inspectors receive all the reported readings, they compare their own readings with the summation of their received readings in real-time. Due to the technical and non-technical losses in the course of power generation, transmission, and distribution, the above two readings are usually not the same. The technical losses can be estimated in line with some mathematical models already established [42] . The nontechnical losses are mainly incurred by electricity theft. Specifically, if one inspector's group contains malicious users, the difference between the two readings exceeds a certain threshold; and this inspector is denoted as "dirty". Otherwise, if all the users in a certain inspector's group are honest, it is denoted as "clean". Assume that there are k inspectors (which are trusted) installed in the distribution room, which are denoted as the set I = {1, 2, ..., k}. Let G i denote the group of smart meters allocated to inspector i (i ∈ I). Then, inspector i is claimed as "dirty" if
where R(i) denotes the reading of meter i (either an inspector or a user's meter), and δ(j) denotes the technical losses of meter j.
The main notations in this paper are listed in Table 1 . In general, we use the lowercase letters to denote variables and the uppercase letters to notate sets. The largest number of users to become malicious in the neighborhood area. I I = {1, 2, ..., k} denotes the set of inspectors in the distribution room, where k is the total number of inspectors. s
The inspector detecting the reading anomalies. Note that we have s ∈ I. t
The reporting period of the smart meters.
Gi
Gi denotes the group of smart meters allocated to inspector i ∈ I.
Binary-Coded Grouping-based Inspection
In this section, we first demonstrate how the inspectors detect the existence of reading anomalies. Then, for exactly locating malicious users, we introduce the working strategy of the BCGI algorithm, which comprises a grouping phase and an inspecting phase. Afterwards, theoretical analyses on the BCGI algorithm are provided. Note that we define a round of inspection as the inspection process from the period when the existence of reading anomalies is detected to the period when malicious users are exactly located. We assume that smart meters' reporting periods can be adjusted short enough such that during one round of inspection, at most one malicious user appears. This is reasonable under some assumptions explained later.
Reading Anomaly Existence Detection
As we have previously mentioned, at the beginning, there are no malicious users in the neighborhood area. At that time, the n users in the neighborhood area are divided into k disjoint groups. Each group is monitored by an inspector in the set I = {1, 2, ..., k}, for the purpose of detecting the existence of reading anomalies. Let a = n k , b = n%k, where % denotes the modulo operation. To make each group contain an equal number of users or as possible as we can, each of the k groups is first randomly allocated with a users. Then, for the first b groups, i.e., G i , i ∈ {1, 2, ..., b} ⊆ I, each of them is further randomly allocated with another user. Technically speaking, we have
where | · | denotes the cardinality of a set. Since the groups are disjoint, for any two inspectors i, j ∈ I, we have G i G j = ∅. For example, in Fig. 2 , we assume that there are a total number of n = 30 users and k = 4 inspectors. As shown in Fig. 2(a) , the users are divided into four disjoint groups. Due to a = 7, b = 2, both the first and second groups contain 8 users; and both the third and fourth groups have 7 users. Assume that one user starts committing electricity theft at a certain period. As aforementioned, this user reports electricity consumptions less than what the user actually consumes. For the inspector monitoring the group containing this user, Inequality (1) obviously holds. Nevertheless, even though the inspector recognizes the existence of reading anomalies, it does not know exactly which user is the one stealing electricity. For locating the malicious user accurately, the users in the neighborhood area smart grid are regrouped to start the inspection process and multiple inspectors are allocated to the group of users which contains the malicious user. Also, at least one remaining inspector is allocated to the other groups of users. If there remains multiple inspectors, these users are further be evenly divided into multiple groups, and each group is monitored by one of the remaining inspectors. We now illustrate the above process with an example in Fig. 2 . As shown in Fig. 2(a) , a user monitored by inspector 1 begins to steal electricity at a certain period. Since inspector 1 detects the existence of reading anomalies, the users previously monitored by it is now jointly probed by three inspectors, i.e., inspectors 1, 2, 3, as shown in Fig. 2(b inspector remains, the users previously in the groups of inspectors 2, 3, 4 are now together monitored by inspector 4.
The above procedures are concluded in Algorithm 1, which is termed as the Reading Anomaly Existence Detection algorithm. When there are no malicious users in the neighborhood area smart grid, the users are evenly divided into different groups, each monitored by an inspector.
Algorithm 1 Reading Anomaly Existence Detection
Require: n users and k inspectors Ensure: The user group containing the malicious user 1: Evenly divide n users into k groups, by Equation (2); 2: for inspector i ∈ I do 3:
if Inequality (1) holds at period t then
4:
A malicious user appear among users in Gi;
5:
Break;
end if 7: end for 8: Allocate multiple inspectors to the group of users containing the malicious user; 9: Allocate remaining inspectors to monitor the remaining users; 10: return The user group containing the malicious user
Grouping Phase of the BCGI algorithm
Let s ∈ I be the inspector detecting the reading anomalies. Then, for the users in G s , each of them is randomly assigned with a unique number from 0 to |G s | − 1 as the user's own identification (ID). This ID is encoded into a binary sequence with the length of log 2 |G s | bits. To identify the unique malicious user, a set of inspectors {1, 2, ..., log 2 |G s | } ⊂ I are commonly allocated to the users in group G s . If the jth digit of a user's binary sequence is "1", then this user is assigned to the jth group, which is monitored by inspector j. Particularly, for the user whose ID is 0, since the user's ID's binary notation contains no '1' digits, the user is not monitored by any inspector. To detect whether there are reading anomalies among the users in i∈I\{s} G i , these users are redivided into k − log 2 |G s | groups, each monitored by an inspector in I\{1, 2, ..., log 2 |G s | }, where "\" denotes the set difference operation. The grouping method for the users in i∈I\{s} G i is the same as that at the start of this section and is not explained in detail here again. The lines 1 ∼ 15 in Algorithm 2 describes the grouping process of the BCGI algorithm, where the function Binary(x, y) returns the binary sequence of number x with the length of y bits.
Taking Fig. 3 as an example, we now describe how the grouping phase works. Assume that there are seven users in inspector s' group G s , which are numbered from 0 to 6. Due to log 2 7 = 3, the inspectors 1, 2, 3 are allocated to the users in G s . The binary notation of user 1 is "001". Thus, the user is allocated to the inspector 1's group. Since the binary notation of user 6 is "110", both inspectors 2 and 3 monitor him. 
Inspecting Phase of the BCGI algorithm
Next, we explain the inspecting phase of the BCGI algorithm. Obviously, if the malicious user belongs to one group, the corresponding inspector turns into "dirty". This is because the malicious user manipulates electricity consumptions to false smaller ones, which makes Inequality (1) hold. For example, in Fig. 3 , we assume that user 5 is the unique malicious one who sends smaller fraudulent electricity consumptions. As user 5 is monitored by both inspectors 1 and 3, the state of these two inspectors transforms into "dirty" (marked with the yellow solid circles), whereas inspector 2 stays "clean" (marked with black solid circle). Let α i denote the state of inspector i. We set α i = 1 if inspector i is "dirty"; otherwise, α i = 0. The BCGI algorithm locates the unique malicious user as the one whose 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 binary sequence of ID is the same as "α log 2 |Gs| . . . α 2 α 1 ". As shown on the top of Fig. 3 , the states of the inspectors can be denoted as the binary sequence "101". The BCGI algorithm recognizes user 5 as malicious because the binary notation of the user's ID is equivalent to "101". The lines 16 ∼ 21 in Algorithm 2 describes the inspecting process of the BCGI algorithm.
Algorithm 2 Binary Coded Grouping-based Inspection (BCGI) Algorithm
Require: Gi, i = 1, 2, ..., k Ensure: mal user{the malicious user} 1: for the users not in Gs do
2:
Regroup them evenly into k − log 2 |Gs| groups: Gj, j ∈ { log 2 |Gs| + 1, . . . , k}; 3: end for 4: for each user in Gs do
5:
Assign the user with a unique number i ∈ [0, |Gs| − 1];
6:
Binary(i, log 2 |Gs| );
for j ← 1 to log 2 |Gs| do 8: if the jth bit of Binary(i, log 2 |Gs| ) is digit "1" then
9:
Gj ← Gj ∪ {i}; 10: end if 11: end for 12: end for{Grouping phase} 13: for i ← 1 to log 2 |Gs| do 14: if inspector i is "dirty" then 15: αi ← 1; if Binary(i, log 2 |Gs| ) == "α log 2 |Gs| . . . α2α1" then 22: mal user ← i; Break; 23: end if 24: end for 25: return mal user
Analysis of the BCGI Algorithm
For the BCGI algorithm, we have the following conclusions. Lemma 1. Under the assumption that there appears one malicious user within one round of inspection, the BCGI algorithm can be used to locate this user when the relationship of the total number of users and inspectors (which is denoted by n and k, respectively) satisfies n ≤ k2 k−1 .
Proof. During the grouping phase of the BCGI algorithm, log 2 |G s | inspectors are commonly allocated to the meters in G s ; and at least one inspector is allocated to the other meters in the neighborhood area. Thus, the total number of inspectors installed in the distribution room must satisfy k log 2 |G s | + 1. Since G s contains at most n k users,
k . This completes the proof.
Theorem 1.
Under the assumption that there appears one malicious user within one round of inspection, the BCGI algorithm can locate this user by one inspection step.
Proof. Assume that user i ∈ G s becomes malicious at a certain reporting period. Let η denote the number of digit "1"s in the binary sequence of user i's ID. According to the grouping phase of the BCGI algorithm, user i is jointly monitored by η inspectors, each corresponding to a digit "1" in user i's binary sequence. This means during the inspection process, these inspectors simultaneously receive user i's smaller fraudulent readings, and this makes their states transform into "dirty". Thus, the inspectors' state sequence "α log 2 |Gs| . . . α 2 α 1 " owns at least η digit "1"s, each also corresponding to a digit "1' in user i's binary sequence. Assume that there are more than η digit "1"s in the sequence "α log 2 |Gs| . . . α 2 α 1 ". Then, we can infer that there are at least one other malicious user (not user i) in G s . This contradicts the assumption that there appears only one malicious user. To sum up, the unique malicious user is the one who has the binary sequence "α log 2 |Gs| . . . α 2 α 1 ". This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
Lemma 2.
Assume that there appears one malicious user within one round of inspection and that there exists one inspector s ∈ I detecting the reading anomalies. Then after the grouping phase of the BCGI algorithm, we have
where i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , log 2 |G s | }, and G i denotes the group of inspector i.
Proof. The ith bit of the binary sequence of the ID of the users in G s has a repeated pattern 0...0
. Taking Fig.   4 as an example, the repeated pattern of the first bit (the rightmost column) is "01"; and for the second bit, it is "0011"; and so forth. As the BCGI algorithm allocates the group G i with the users whose binary sequence of ID have a digit "1" at the ith bit, the group G i contains at least 2
, then for the users whose ID ranges from 2
to |G s | − 1, the ith bit of their binary sequence is "0". Thus, in this case, we have
, for the users whose ID is not less than 2
, the ith bit of their binary sequence is digit "1". Thus, for the case
, we have
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Assume that there appears one malicious user within one round of inspection and that there exists one inspector s ∈ I detecting the reading anomalies. Then after the grouping phase of the BCGI algorithm, we have 1 from Lemma 2. This completes the proof.
Lemma 4.
Assume that there appears one malicious user within one round of inspection and that there exists one inspector s ∈ I detecting the reading anomalies. Then after the grouping phase of the BCGI algorithm, we have:
where G i denotes the group of inspector i.
Proof. Consider the two groups G i and G i+1 . From Fig.  4 , we know that for the ith bit of the binary sequence, the repeated pattern is 0...0
. For the (i+1)th bit, it is 0...0
, which equals 0...0
. Comparing the two patterns, we have the following conclusions:
, the ith column and (i + 1)th column in Fig. 4 have the same number of digit "1"s. This means that groups G i and G i+1 contain the same number of users; Fig. 4 , the ith column has more digit "1"s than the (i + 1)th column. In this case, G i contains more users than G i+1 ; From Lemma 4, we can infer that for any given G s , after the grouping phase of the BCGI algorithm, among the groups G i , ∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..., log 2 |G s | }, the group inspected by inspector log 2 |G s | contains the fewest users.
Choosing the Reporting Period
With regard to the stochastic process for modeling the times at which arrivals enter a system, Poisson process [43] is one of the simplest and most widely used stochastic processes. For example, homogeneous Poisson process can describe the number of failures which occur in a computer network over time intervals. In our case, the "arrival" is the occurrence of the event that a user turns into "malicious"; and the "system" is the smart grid in the neighborhood area. Thus, Poisson process is adopted here to model the process of users turning into malicious. As defined earlier, a round of inspection means the inspection process from the period when the existence of reading anomalies is detected to the period when malicious users are exactly located.
Lemma 5. Let τ (τ > 0) denote the reporting period of smart meters. Let w denote the number of reporting periods that a round of inspection lasts for. Assume that for any given time interval of length T , there appear at most m malicious users, and that the arrival process of the malicious users can be described by a Poisson process with intensity λ, where 0 < λ ≤ λ max = m T . Then, we can choose an appropriate reporting period τ such that Pr{N (t+wτ ) − N (t) ≥ 2} ≤ ε, where N (t) (t > 0) denotes the number of users turning into malicious during time interval (0, t], and ε is an arbitrarily small constant.
Proof. Obviously, the random process {N (t): t ≥ 0} is a counting process which has the following properties: (1) N (t) is a non-negative integer and N (0)=0 ; (2) for every t > t > 0, N (t ) − N (t) has the same distribution function as N (t − t); (3) if the two time intervals (t 1 , t 2 ] and (t 3 , t 4 ] have no overlap, i.e., (t 1 , t 2 ] ∩ (t 3 , t 4 ]=∅, then N (t 2 ) − N (t 1 ) and N (t 4 ) − N (t 3 ) are statistically independent. Thus, it is reasonable to describe the arrival process of malicious users with the Poisson process of intensity λ. For any given t > 0, we have [43] Pr{N (t + wτ ) − N (t) = r} = (λwτ ) 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 To make the probability of two or more users becoming malicious during one round of inspection less than an arbitrarily small ε, we just need to control the length of the reporting period such that 
In line with the Lambert W function 3 [44] , we can derive the following inequality:
where "e" is the natural constant. This completes the proof of Lemma 5.
From Lemma 5, we know that under the Poisson process assumption, the probability of at most one malicious user appearing during one round of inspection can be made arbitrarily close to 1 by adjusting the smart meters' reporting periods. Apparently, it takes the inspectors one reporting period to detect the existence of reading anomalies. According to Theorem 1, the inspectors can locate the unique malicious user by one inspection step, which also lasts for one reporting period. Thus, we can know that when the BCGI algorithm is applied, a round of inspection lasts for two periods in total. Mathematically speaking, for the BCGI algorithm, we have w = 2. Based on Equation (4), we can derive that the reporting period for applying the BCGI algorithm should not exceed −
Fig . 5 depicts the maximum reporting period τ max for the BCGI algorithm under three cases: T = 2 days, 4 days, 6 days. We set ε = 0.02, and the number of users to become malicious (i.e., m) ranges from 5 to 50. In Fig. 5 , we observe that τ max decreases quickly with the increase of m. When m is a smaller value, there is a larger difference between the maximum reporting period of different T s. As m gets larger, this difference becomes smaller. For example, with regard to the case T = 2 day and the case T = 4 days, 3 If x is a real number, then for − when m = 5, the difference of their maximum reporting period is about 60 minutes; while m = 25, this difference narrows down to less than 20 minutes. Additionally, for any given m, the bigger T always yields a larger τ max .
Generalized Coded Grouping-based Inspection
It is pointed out in Lemma 1 that the total number of users n and the total number of inspectors k must satisfy n ≤ k2 k−1 so that the BCGI algorithm can work. However, in the real world, there exist occasions where the above relationship cannot be satisfied. This is mainly due to the following two factors. On the one hand, the utility companies have a limited budget on installing the inspectors [45] [46]. On the other hand, the following situation is possible: at the beginning, the number of users in the neighborhood area and the inspectors installed in the distribution room satisfies the relationship in Lemma 1. However, as time passes by, with more and more users moving into the neighborhood area smart grid, this relationship does not hold any more. These factors challenge us to consider the following problem: if we just have a limited number of inspectors which is not enough for the BCGI algorithm to work, what should we do to identify the malicious users in the neighborhood area? In the following, we address the problem by proposing two generalized approaches.
The MCGI Algorithm
In the MCGI algorithm, its basic idea is to encode users' IDs into (l + 1)-nary notations, where l is adaptively determined by the total number of users and the number of available inspectors. For different inspection steps, users are grouped according to different digits of the (l + 1)-nary notations.
As aforementioned in Section 4.1, at least one inspector should be allocated to monitor the users not in G s . As defined earlier, s is the inspector detecting the existence of reading anomalies. Since there are a total number of 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 k inspectors in the distribution room, we can infer that at most k − 1 inspectors are allocated to the users in G s . When the MCGI algorithm starts, it first finds a minimum l satisfying |G s | ≤ (l + 1) k−1 . Since G s contains at most n k users, we have
For example, if we have n = 27 and k = 3, the appropriate l should be 2. Then, similar to the BCGI algorithm, the MCGI algorithm randomly allocates the users in G s with unique numbers from 0 to |G s |−1 as their IDs. These IDs are then encoded into the (l + 1)-nary notations with the length of log l+1 |G s | bits. For example, in Fig. 6(a) , the IDs of the 9 users in G s are uniformly transformed into a 2-bit long ternary notations. Afterwards, to locate the unique malicious users, the MCGI algorithm performs several inspection steps. For each inspection step, a set of inspectors which are denoted as I g = {1, 2, ..., log l+1 |G s | } ⊂ I are allocated to jointly inspect the users in G s . As we can see, in Fig. 6(a) , the users are jointly inspected by 2 inspectors. In the jth inspection step, the users whose ith bit of their (l + 1)-nary notations is digit (l + 1 − j) are grouped to the inspector i, where 1 ≤ i ≤ log l+1 |G s | . Taking Fig. 6 as an example, to locate the malicious user among the 9 users, two inspection steps are conducted. At the first inspection step, the users 6, 7 and 8 are allocated to inspector 2's group, since the second bits (from the right) of their ternary notations are digit "2"; the users 8, 5, 2 are assigned to inspector 1's group, since they all have the digit "2" at the first bit of their ternary notations; particularly, the other users are not monitored by either inspector 1 or inspector 2, since they have no digit "2" in their ternary notations.
In the second inspection step, only user 5 is monitored by inspector 2, because the ternary notation of user 2 has no digit "1". For the jth inspection step, if inspector i is "dirty", we can conclude that the ith bit of the (l + 1)-nary notation of the malicious meter is l + 1 − j. The malicious user in G s is the one whose ID is
where c ij = l + 1 − j if inspector i is "dirty" at the jth inspection step; otherwise, c ij = 0. For example, in Fig.  6 , at the first inspection step, inspector 1 is declared to be "dirty". Thus, we can know that the first bit of the malicious user's ternary notion is digit 2. Since inspector 2 is "dirty" at the second inspection step, we can derive the second bit is digit 1. Combining the above results, we know that user 5 is malicious. Let G ji denote the group of inspector i at the jth inspection step. Let I d (j) denote the set of "dirty" inspectors at the jth inspection step. Since there is only one malicious user in G s , this user must be in the intersection of the groups of the inspectors in I d (j). For the "clean" inspectors in I g \I d (j), their groups definitely contain no malicious user. Hence, before the (j + 1)th inspection step begins, the search area of the MCGI algorithm should be updated as
G ji . For example, in Fig. 6 , at the first inspection step, inspector 1 is "dirty". This means that the unique malicious user must be among users 8, 5, 2. Since inspector 2 is "clean", we can further claim user 8 as honest. Thus, the search area of the second inspection step contains only users 5 and 2. Particularly, if during the jth inspection step, no inspectors are declared to be "dirty", then the search area of the (j + 1)th inspection step should be the users not monitored by the inspectors. For instance, in Fig. 6 , if user 4 is malicious, then both inspectors 1 and 2 are "clean" at the first inspection step, and the search area of the second inspection step should be users 4, 3, 1, and 0 (since they are not inspected by inspectors 1 and 2). To sum up, let A j denote the search area of the jth inspection step, where 0 ≤ j ≤ l, j ∈ N + . Then, we have
where
The above strategies are concluded in Algorithm 3, where G s denotes the set of users which possibly contains the unique malicious user. Theorem 2. Under the assumption that there appears one malicious user within one round of inspection, the MCGI algorithm can locate this user from n users by at most l inspection steps with k inspectors, where n, k ∈ N + , and l = k−1 n k − 1 . Proof. According to the MCGI algorithm, the users in G s are allocated with log l+1 |G s | inspectors, each corresponding to one bit of their (l + 1)-nary notation of ID. At the jth inspection step, inspector i's group contains the users whose ith bit of the (l + 1)-nary notation is l + 1 − j. Thus, if the ith inspector turns "dirty" at the jth inspection step, the ith bit of the unique malicious user's (l + 1)-nary notation is l + 1 − j. If the state of inspector i stays "clean" from the first through the jth inspection step, then the ith bit of the unique malicious user's (l + 1)-nary notation must be among 0, 1, ..., l − j. Particularly, if inspector i remains "clean" until the lth inspection step, the ith bit of the malicious user's (l + 1)-nary notation is definitely "0". If several inspectors turn "dirty" at one inspection step, several bits of the malicious user's (l + 1)-nary notation can be determined at one time. In this case, less than l inspection steps are taken. In conclusion, all the bits of the malicious user's (l + 1)-nary notation are determined no later than the lth inspection step, according to which the malicious user's ID can be determined. Hence, the malicious user can be identified by at most l inspection steps.
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Algorithm 3 M-ary Coded Grouping-based Inspection (MCGI) Algorithm
Require: Gs Ensure: mal user{the malicious user} 1: Allocate one inspector to monitor the users not in Gs; 2: for each user in Gs do
3:
Allocate a unique number in [0, |Gs| − 1];
4:
Code this number into its (l + 1)-nary notation; 5: end for 6: q ← 0; G s ← Gs; 7: for j ← 1 to l {Conduct l rounds of inspection} do 8: for i ← 1 to log l+1 |Gs| do
9:
Gji ← ∅; {Initializing Gji before every inspection} 10: end for 11: for each user in G s do 12: for i ← 1 to log l+1 |Gs| do 13: if the ith bit of his the user's (l + 1)-nary notation is (l+1−j) then
14:
Add this user into Gji; 15: end if 16: end for{Grouping} 17: end for 18: for i ← 1 to log l+1 |Gs| do 19: if inspector i is "dirty" then 20: 
Gji;{Updating the search area} 27: if |G s| == 1 then 28: mal user ← the user in G s; Break; 29: end if 30: end for 31: return mal user; each inspection step lasts for one reporting period, we can derive that a round of inspection by the MCGI algorithm lasts for at most l + 1 reporting periods (plus the period during which the inspectors detect the existence of reading anomalies). Thus, according to Equation (4), we can derive that the reporting period for applying the MCGI algorithm should not exceed − 
Lemma 6.
Assume that there appears one malicious user within one round of inspection and that there exists one inspector s ∈ I detecting the reading anomalies. Then for the MCGI algorithm, we have
where 1 ≤ j ≤ l, j ∈ N + , i ∈ {1, ..., log l+1 |G s | }, and G ji denotes the group of inspector i at the jth round of inspection of the MCGI algorithm.
Proof. The ith bit of the (l + 1)-nary notation of the users in G s has a repeated pattern 0...0
For the users in G s , the ith bit of the (l + 1)-nary notation has |Gs| (l+1) i complete such pattern. Thus, ∀1 ≤ j ≤ l and i ∈ {1, ..., log l+1 |G s | }, G ji contains at least
users. Since at the jth inspection step, the MCGI algorithm allocates the users with the digit (l + 1 − j) at the ith bit to inspector i, we have: (1) if
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i , the number of the users in G ji is
This completes the proof.
The G-BCGI Algorithm
In this subsection, we explain how the G-BCGI algorithm works. Compared to the MCGI algorithm by which users' IDs are encoded into M-ary notations, the G-BCGI algorithm has more things in common with the BCGI algorithm. In both BCGI and G-BCGI algorithms, users' IDs are encoded into binary notations, according to which users are grouped. However, in the G-BCGI algorithm, due to the shortage of inspectors, more than one inspection step is usually conducted. We give more details about the G-BCGI algorithm in the following.
Assume that inspector k ∈ I = {1, 2, ..., k} is allocated to monitor the users not in G s , where s, as defined earlier, is the inspector that detects the existence of reading anomalies. Let I g = I \ {k} = {1, 2, ..., k − 1}. The inspectors I g are allocated correspondingly to conduct the inspection among the users in G s , for the purpose of locating the unique malicious user. As in Algorithm 3, we use G s to denote the set of users which contain the malicious user during one round of inspection. Apparently, at the beginning, we have G s = G s . For each inspection step, the users in G s are grouped as follows: (1) each user in G s is assigned with a unique ID number in {1, 2, ..., |G s |}; (2) the ID numbers are then encoded into binary sequences with the length of max( log 2 |G s | , |I g |) bits; (3) for a given user i, i ∈ G s , if the jth bit from the rightmost of the ID's binary sequence is digit "1", then user i is allocated to inspector j's group. For example, in Fig. 7 , we assume that two inspectors are allocated to monitor the users in G s , which originally contains a total number of twelve users. Since log 2 12 = 4, the users' IDs are encoded into binary sequences with four bits. Inspector 1 monitors the users whose IDs' last bit is digit "1", i.e., the users with binary sequences 0001, 0011, 0101, 0111, 1001, and 1011; inspector 2 monitors the users whose IDs' second bit from the rightmost is digit "1", i.e., the users with binary sequences 0010, 0011, 0110, 0111, 1010, and 1011. We conclude the above strategies in lines 30 ∼ 40 in procedure group users. On the whole, the grouping phases in the BCGI algorithm and the G-BCGI algorithm are similar. The differences mainly lie in the following aspects: (1) in the BCGI algorithm, all bits of the binary notations of users' IDs are made use of, whereas in the G-BCGI algorithm, fewer bits are exploited; (2) in the G-BCGI algorithm, users are allocated with unique IDs for multiple times, whereas it happens for one time in the BCGI algorithm. The above two aspects are due to the lack of inspectors.
With the inspection process going on, set G s is constantly narrowed down. This procedure is similar to that in the MCGI algorithm. For reading convenience, we briefly rewrite it here. To be consistent, we still denote by G ji and I d (j) inspector i's group and the set of "dirty" inspectors at the jth inspection step, respectively. As aforementioned, the unique malicious user must be in the intersection of the groups of "dirty" inspectors, but not in the groups of"clean" inspectors. Thus, we have
where as defined earlier, A j denotes the search area (i.e., G s ) at the jth inspection step, and we have A 1 = G s . For instance, in Fig. 7 , at the first inspection step, both inspectors 1 and 2 are "dirty"; at the second inspection step, only three users that are not monitored by either inspectors 1 or 2 are probed. We concluded the above strategies in lines 4 ∼ 15 in Algorithm 4. If G s is reduced to contain only one user, we can simply claim that the unique user in G s is malicious. For the cases 1 < |G s | ≤ 2 k−1 , the G-BCGI algorithm is actually reduced to the BCGI algorithm. In this case, only one more inspection step are needed to be conducted for locating the malicious user. As shown in Fig. 7 , after the first inspection step, only three users remain in G s . Since we have two inspectors to monitor them and |G s | < 2 2 , the malicious user can be identified as the user whose binary sequence is "10" at the second inspection step. These strategies are summarized in lines 16 ∼ 27 in Algorithm 4. Theorem 3. Under the assumption that there appears one malicious user within one round of inspection, the G-BCGI algorithm can locate this user from n users by at most log 2 k−1 n k inspection steps with k inspectors, where n, k ∈ N + .
Proof. According to the G-BCGI algorithm, at each inspection step, k − 1 inspectors are allocated to monitor the users in G s . Particularly, inspector j ∈ I g = {1, 2, ..., k −1} monitors the users whose newly allocated IDs have digit 1 at the jth bit from the rightmost of their binary sequences. Actually, for each inspection step, G s can be divided into 2 k−1 groups. Each of the groups contains users whose rightmost k bits of the binary sequences of the newly allocated IDs are 0...00 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 G s is reduced to one of the above groups. Thus, we have
. As aforementioned, A 1 = G s , which contains at most n k users. We know that once we have |A j | < 2 k−1 , the unique malicious user can be identified. Thus, the problem to find the maximum number of inspection steps is equivalent to find the minimum j satisfying |A j | < 2 k−1 . According to the above analyses, it should be the minimum j which satisfies
. It is not difficult for us to derive that the maximum number of inspection steps is log 2 k−1 n k . This completes the proof.
Let l = log 2 k−1 n k . Based upon Theorem 3, we can derive that a round of inspection by the G-BCGI algorithm lasts for at most l + 1 reporting periods (plus the period during which the inspectors detect the existence of reading anomalies). Thus, according to Equation (4), we can derive that the reporting period for applying the GCGI algorithm should not exceed − T (l +1)m W −1 ε−1 e + 1 .
Comparison: BCGI vs. MCGI vs. G-BCGI
We next compare the BCGI, MCGI and G-BCGI algorithms. Through the above discussion, we can find that the BCGI algorithm is actually a particular form of both the MCGI and G-BCGI algorithms. In both the BCGI and G-BCGI algorithms, users' IDs are encoded into binary notations. In contrast, in the MCGI algorithm, users' IDs are encoded into (l + 1)-nary notations, where l is adaptively determined by the total number of users as well as available inspectors in the neighborhood area smart grid. Regardless of the methods to encode users' IDs, the purpose is to facilitate the grouping process.
In the real application, when the utility companies detect the existence of reading anomalies, they would like to identify the malicious users as soon as possible. Hence, if there are enough inspectors available, we prefer to apply the BCGI algorithm, which is capable of locating the unique malicious user by just one inspection step. However, if we are short of inspectors for applying the BCGI algorithm, both the MCGI and G-BCGI algorithms can be employed. Compared to the BCGI algorithm, both of them have the trade-off of more inspection steps. For different inspection steps of one round of inspection, the users in G s have the same unique ID numbers in the MCGI algorithm, whereas these users are allocated with different unique ID numbers at each inspection step in the G-BCGI algorithm. This makes the search area narrowed down faster in the G-BCGI algorithm than in the MCGI algorithm. According to Theorem 2 and Theorem 3, we know that the maximum number of inspection steps for the MCGI algorithm and the G-BCGI algorithm is l = k−1 n k − 1 and l = log 2 k−1 n k , respectively. For given n and k, we apparently have l < l. Thus, we can conclude that the G-BCGI algorithm is more efficient than the MCGI algorithm.
As aforementioned, to guarantee that at most one malicious user appears during one round of inspection, smart meters' reporting periods for the BCGI algorithm, the MCGI algorithm and the G-BCGI algorithm should be no more than − + 1 , respectively. Note that we have l > l ≥ 1, thus the reporting periods for the BCGI algorithm is the largest, followed by the G-BCGI algorithm and then the MCGI algorithm. Since a smaller reporting period implies a greater communication overhead, we can infer that among the above three algorithms, the communication overhead for the MCGI algorithm is the greatest, followed by the G-BCGI algorithm. The communication overhead for the BCGI algorithm is the smallest. We conclude the above conclusions in Table 2 , where we write f (x)=O(g(x)) if there exist constants c, x 0 > 0 such that 0 ≤ f (x) ≤ cg(x) for all x ≥ x 0 .
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Algorithm 4 Generalized Binary Coded Groupingbased Inspection (G-BCGI) Algorithm
Require: Gs Ensure: mal user{the malicious user} 1: Allocate inspector i ∈ I to monitor users not in Gs;
group users(G s , I \ {inspector k});
5:
for inspector j ∈ I \ {k} do
if inspector j's status is "dirty" then 8:
end if 10:
end for 11:
end if 14:
Gji;{Updating the search area} mal user ← the user in G s ; 18: else 19: group users(Gs, I \ {inspector k}); 20: for inspector k ← 1 to k − 1 do
21:
if inspector j is "dirty" then 22: αi ← 1; IDi ← ID list.pop(0); 35: for j ← 1 to |It| do 36: if the jth bit from the rightmost of Binary(IDi, max( log 2 |G s | , |It|)) is "1" then
37:
Gj ← Gj ∪ {user i}; 38: end if 39: end for 40: end for
Final notes
Note that for all of the three proposed algorithms, there are possible false alerts due to many known and unknown reasons such as faults. In this paper, we treat faulty meters as the same as malicious meters. When an inspector detects an abnormal reading, further investigation is needed by one of the proposed algorithms, and if the chosen algorithm cannot pinpoint the malicious meter at the end, the algorithm needs to make a log entry and then moves on. If a malicious/faulty meter is identified, the algorithm is finished and the corresponding personnel will take over the case for further investigations, collecting evidence, and finally handling the case.
Experiment
This section reports the experiment results. The programs use Python 2.7.13 on an integrated development environment platform -PyCharm Community Edition 2017.1.3. The users' electricity consumption data are from the individual household electric power consumption data set in [47] . The data are the measurements of electric power consumptions in one household with a one-minute sampling rate over a period of almost four years. The honest users genuinely report their electricity consumptions. Once a user becomes malicious, the user reports the electricity consumption less at a certain percentage (which is randomly chosen). For convenience of implementation, technical losses are assumed to be proportional to actual electricity consumptions. In the experiments, we assume that the ratio of technical losses to actual electricity consumptions is about 5%. Note that each piece of data in the figures of this section is based upon the average value of 100 repeats.
BCGI
In this section, we assume that there are enough inspectors installed in the distribution room such that the BCGI algorithms can be conducted when necessary.
For validating the correctness of the BCGI algorithm, we first conduct three experiments in which we apply the BCGI algorithm to locate a unique user from eight users, using three inspectors. We set smart meters' reporting period as 15 minutes. Users' reported readings, inspectors' measurement readings, and statuses are recorded in Table  3, Table 4 , and Table 5 , respectively. In Table 5 , we use "1" to denote the "dirty" status and "0" to represent 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 the "clean" status. The eight users are numbered from 0 to 7 and the three inspectors are numbered from 1 to 3. In the experiments, inspector 3 monitors users 4, 5, 6, 7; inspector 2 monitors users 2, 3, 5, 7; inspector 1 monitors users 1, 3, 5, 7. In the first experiment, we set user 6 as malicious. As shown in Table 5 , inspectors' statuses can be represented as "110", which is equal to user 6's binary sequence. Thus, user 6 is identified as a malicious user in experiment 1. In experiments 2 and 3, we set users 2 and 5 as malicious users. As shown in Table 5 , these two users can also be located in line with inspectors' statuses. The experiments verify that the BCGI algorithm can identify the unique malicious user accurately. In Fig. 8 , we present the minimum number of inspectors required by the BCGI algorithm. As shown in the figure, as the number of users n increases from 50 to 500, the minimum number of inspectors increases monotonically. When n = 50, at least 5 inspectors are needed to implement the BCGI algorithm. In contrast, when n = 500, at least 8 inspectors are needed. 
MCGI
We conduct three experiments to verify the correctness of the MCGI algorithm. In the experiments, we apply the MCGI algorithm to locate one malicious user from a total number of twelve users, using two inspectors. This means that users' IDs should be encoded into 4-nary notations. We set smart meters' reporting periods as 15 minutes. Users' reported readings and inspectors' measurement readings are recorded in Table 6 and Table 7 , respectively. In particular, for the cases where an inspector's reading is 0, the corresponding inspector does not inspect any users in that inspection step. In Table 8 , we record inspectors' statuses in each inspection step. We set user 5 as malicious at the first experiment, where the inspectors conduct three inspection steps in total. At the first, second, and third inspection steps, inspector 2 monitors the users whose first bits of IDs' 4-nary notation are digit 3, digit 2, and digit 1, respectively; and inspector 1 inspects the users whose second bits are digit 3, digit 2, and digit 1, respectively. At the first and the second inspection steps, both of the two inspectors are "clean". Thus, we can infer that there are no digits 3 and 2 in the 4-nary notation of the malicious user's ID. In contrast, in the third inspection step, both of the two inspectors are "dirty", from which we can infer that the 4-nary notation of the malicious user's ID is "11". Thus, in experiment 1, user 5 is identified as malicious. In experiments 2 and 3, users 11 and 9 are set as malicious users. As shown in Table 8 , both of the two users are also accurately located. This validates the correctness of the MCGI algorithm. In Fig. 9 , we evaluate the performance of the MCGI algorithm, under the following two cases: (1) k = 4; and (2) k = 5, where k, as defined earlier, is the number of inspectors. As shown in the figure, regardless of the value of k, the maximum number of inspection steps increases monotonically with the number of users n. For example, under the case k = 4, this number increases from 2 to 4 when the number of users n ranges from 50 to 500. This is consistent with the conclusions in Theorem 2. For the average number of inspection steps, we can observe that on the whole, it increases stably, despite of some slight ups and downs. The small fluctuation is mainly due to the encoding of the malicious user. Furthermore, from Fig. 9 , we can 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 observe that for any given number of users, the MCGI algorithm takes less (or equal) inspection steps under the case k = 5 than under the case k = 4. Particularly, for the case k = 5 and n = 50, the number of inspection steps is one. In this case, the MCGI algorithm actually becomes to the BCGI algorithm. 
G-BCGI
For better understanding and verifying the G-BCGI algorithm, we apply it to locate a malicious user from a total number of twelve users, using two inspectors. The results of three experiments are shown in Table 9, Table 10,  and Table 11 , in which users' reported readings, inspectors' measurement readings and the corresponding inspection results are recorded, respectively. Particularly, in Table 10 , we also note down the users inspected by the inspectors at each inspection step with square brackets followed by measurement readings. As shown in the table, at the first inspection step of experiment 1, the status of inspector 1 is "dirty". This means that the users monitored by it, i.e., users 11, 4, 0, 8, 2, 6, contain the malicious user. Since the status of inspector 2 which monitors users 3, 1, 4, 6 is "clean", we can infer that users 4, 6 are honest and that the malicious user must be among users 11, 0, 8, 2. By analyzing the inspection results at the second inspection step of experiment 1, we can know that user 11 is malicious. By scrutinizing the inspection results, we can know that users 6, 11 are malicious at experiments 2, 3, respectively.
We evaluate the performance of the G-BCGI algorithm in Fig. 10 under the case k = 3 and the case k = 4, respectively. As shown in the figure, both the average number and the maximum number of inspection steps increase monotonically with the number of users n. For example, if we have four inspectors in the distribution room, when the number of users n increases from 50 to 500, the maximum number of inspection steps increases monotonically from 2 to 3, and the average number increases correspondingly from 1.5 to 2.9. In addition, we can also observe that for a given n, a larger number of inspectors implies fewer inspection steps. This is consistent with the conclusions in Theorem 3.
BCGI vs. MCGI vs. G-BCGI vs. DCI
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the BCGI, MCGI, and G-BCGI algorithms in comparison with the latest contribution -the DCI algorithm [18, 19] under the average case 4 . In Fig. 11 , the performance of the above four algorithms are evaluated with the following two metrics -the number of inspection steps and the number of inspectors. As we can see from Fig. 11(a) , for any given number of users, the BCGI algorithm always takes the fewest inspection steps to locate the unique malicious user, followed by the G-BCGI algorithm, and then the MCGI algorithm; the DCI algorithm always takes the most inspection steps. However, we should not neglect the following facts in Fig. 11(b) : (1) the BCGI algorithm always requires the most inspectors; (2) the DCI algorithm only needs two inspectors: one is the head inspector and one is the sub-inspector [18, 19] ; (3) for the MCGI and G-BCGI algorithms, two inspectors are used.
Thus, for fairly evaluating the performance of different algorithms, we introduce a new metric, i.e., the average number of users whose status ('malicious' or 'honest') are determined by one inspector at one inspection step. Mathematically speaking, it is n nsk , where n s denotes the total number of inspection steps. Obviously, a larger n nsk implies a more efficient algorithm in detecting the malicious users. Fig. 12 compares the BCGI, MCGI, G-BCGI, and DCI algorithms in terms of this new metric. Obviously, under this new metric, the BCGI algorithm is still the most efficient algorithm, followed by the G-BCGI and then MCGI algorithms. The DCI algorithm is always the least efficient. This validates that when we have enough number of inspectors, the best choice is the BCGI algorithm; and if the number of inspectors is not enough for the BCGI algorithm, but enough for the MCGI and G-BCGI algorithms, the G-BCGI algorithm should be applied . 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63 64 65 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64 
Conclusion & Fulture Work
For identifying malicious users in the neighborhood area smart grid, we propose three novel inspection algorithms: the BCGI, MCGI, and G-BCGI algorithms. Under the assumption that at most one user becomes malicious during one round of inspection, we can apply the BCGI algorithm to locate the unique malicious user by only one inspection step, provided that enough inspectors are installed in the distribution room. When we are short of inspectors, both the MCGI and G-BCGI algorithms can be employed. Both of them are essentially general forms of the BCGI algorithm. For different inspection steps of a round of inspection, the users' unique ID numbers do not change in the MCGI algorithm. These numbers are encoded into M-ary notations. In contrast, in the G-BCGI algorithm, the users are allocated with different unique ID numbers for different inspection steps, which are always encoded into binary notations. Therefore, the G-BCGI algorithm can narrow down the search area more quickly than the MCGI algorithm. Both theoretic analyses and experiment results show that the G-BCGI algorithm is better than the MCGI algorithm in terms of inspection steps and communication overhead.
This paper focuses on the situation where smart meters' reporting period is adjusted short enough such that at most one malicious user appears during one round of inspection. However, in the real world, even though the reporting period is set short, there still exist the cases where several users happen to turn into malicious within a short time interval. In addition, if the reporting period is set too short, the extensive meter reports cause a large communication overhead for the smart grid. Thus, in the future work, we will focus on a more general case where multiple malicious users appear during one round of inspection.
In this paper, our focus is on finding electrical theft. If an attacker reports more (instead of less) consumption, our algorithms just ignore the instances without future investigation. Note that our algorithms begin when finding that the reported total amount is less than the measured consumption, and otherwise, our algorithms will do nothing. In other words, the utility company who uses our methods only care if the company lose money, but may not care whether the company over change money. However, as a future study, we will investigate the problem (as a new problem) that the utility overcharges users if a malicious meter reports more energy consumption than the real consumption.
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